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Discretionary fiscal policy in Vietnam over business cycles and inflation, 
1990-2015 
 
Abstract. 
 
This study examines the cyclicality of discretionary fiscal policy in Vietnam using annual time 
series from 1990 to 2015. The change in cyclically adjusted balance (fiscal impulse) is utilized as 
the indicator of active fiscal action, while the output gap as the proxy for business cycle. Evidence 
shows discretionary fiscal policy follows a procyclical trend over business cycles, but reversed 
since 2008. In addition, discretionary fiscal policy is more procyclical during recessions than in 
booms. Finally, discretionary fiscal policy tends to react to inflation in a stabilizing way, i.e., 
contractive after inflation surges and expansive after inflation dives. This suggests that Vietnam 
has been using discretionary fiscal policy to stabilize general price level rather than output cycles.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In order to perform its stabilization function, Keynesian economics implicitly suggest that 
discretionary fiscal policy should be countercyclical to the trade cycle. When the economy is in 
recession, fiscal policy should be expansionary to help the economy recover; when in booms, fiscal 
policy should be contractionary to reduce inflationary pressure from rising income and prices. 
Empirical research in this area over the past decade however shown that fiscal policy in developing 
countries are often procyclical, meaning they tend to amplify the business cycle. For whatever 
reasons, a procyclical conduct of fiscal policy induces price volatility, endangers the prospect of 
macroeconomic stability and economic growth in the medium and long run.   
 
Vietnam as a low-middle income country in the Southeast Asia might not be an exception among 
the developing countries. Recent researches on cyclical behavior of fiscal instruments in Vietnam 
found that fiscal policy was also procyclical, but the conclusion is either lack statistically 
significant evidence (i.e., Thien and Hoi, 2016), or inconclusive (i.e., Nguyen T.H.K., 2016). 
Neither of the studies examines the macroeconomic factors that could influence the conduct of 
procyclical discretionary fiscal policy in Vietnam, though attempts have been made to study the 
impacts of fiscal policy on macroeconomic stability and economic growth. In line with these recent 
developments in research, this thesis asked two fundamental questions to validate previous 
findings and close the gap in the literature: 
 
1.    How did discretionary fiscal policy in Vietnam respond to business cycle? 
2.    Did price level influence the conduct of discretionary fiscal policy?  
 
To answers these questions successfully, the following goals should be achieved: 
 
•    Introduce the theoretical frameworks that describe how fiscal policy works over cycles. 
•   Review the literature in the cyclicality of fiscal policy to find out what are known and what 
should be fulfilled.  
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•    Research into the history of fiscal policy in Vietnam to find out the key characteristics of fiscal 
policy and identify structural breaks in data.   
•    Present suitable methodological approaches to answering the research questions effectively. 
•    Analyze economic performance and fiscal variables for Vietnam during the sample period.  
•    Give an ex-post empirical analysis of Vietnamese fiscal policy based on available data.   
•    Provide conclusions from empirical findings. 
     
The structure of this master thesis is organized as followed. Chapter 2 presents the fundamental 
theories of discretionary fiscal policy, along with basic concepts, components, rules and critics of 
the discretionary fiscal policy. After theoretical considerations, Chapter 3 reviews state of the art 
in the literature about the characteristics and developments of fiscal policy’s cyclicality around the 
world and in Vietnam. Chapter 4 explains in detail the steps and methodologies used in this 
research to estimate economic fluctuations, discretionary fiscal policy and the relationship between 
these variables. Chapter 5 delves deeper into the Vietnamese literature to study the evolution of 
fiscal policy in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam since its inception. Chapter 6, the main analysis 
of the study, attempts to answer the question of the cyclical conduct of Vietnam’s discretionary 
fiscal policy and further investigates the relationship between price level and active fiscal 
measures. Chapter 7 summarizes the main findings, and the final section concludes this master 
thesis with some remarks. 
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2. Theories 
 
Fiscal policy refers to the government’s deliberate intervention in the market process to alter the 
outcome. The application of fiscal policy in practice is based on a book titled “the General Theory” 
written in 1936 by British economist John Maynard Keynes. Mankiw (1993) held that no book in 
economics has been more praised and more vilified than the General Theory published in the midst 
of the Great Depression. In the introduction of this classic, Keynes (1936:3) argued that the 
characteristics of the classical theory “happen not to be those of the economic society in which we 
actually live”. Hence, Keynes proposed an analytical framework to include the government in it. 
 
2.1  Keynes’ baseline theory 
 
The theory of fiscal policy began with a well-known national income accounting entity used to 
measure the aggregate level of economic activity in a given time:    
 
Y = C + I + G + NX    (1) 
Where,  
  (C) is final household’s consumption  
  (I) is gross capital formation (investment) 
  (G) is final government’s final consumption 
  (NX) is net export (export – import) 
  (Y) is Gross Domestic Production (GDP)  
 
Equation (2) makes it clear that governments can affect economic activity by influencing (Y) 
directly through fiscal policy (G), and influencing (C), (I) and (NX) indirectly.  
 
The government’s consumption can affect household’s consumption and private investment 
indirectly because of household’s saving behaviors. For example, as government hires people to 
build public infrastructure (schools, airports, bridges, etc.), households have more income, and 
they spend a portion of this extra income to buy from others (increase consumption) and save the 
rest for the bank deposit. An additional saving as bank deposit means an extra investment. 
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Therefore an additional government spending can affect the level of consumption and investment 
in private sector indirectly.1  
 
Fiscal policy can also affect import and export level indirectly through tariff and subsidy programs. 
For example, when the government raises the tariff on imported goods and spends a significant 
amount of capital to subsidize exports, fiscal policy as such pushes the trade balance towards a 
surplus zone. On the other hand, when government lower taxes on imports, price declines and so 
domestic demand for goods and services from oversea rises, pushing the trade balance towards the 
deficit zone.   
 
Fiscal policy that increases aggregate demand (AD) directly through an increase in government 
spending or taxation is typically called expansionary. Fiscal policy, on the other hand, is 
considered contractionary if it aims to reduce demand through a tax hike or austerity program. 
Figure 2.1  and Figure 2.2 illustrate how discretionary fiscal policy can be used as a stabilization 
tool during recessions and booms. In this baseline model, an expansionary fiscal policy would shift 
AD curve to the right, while a contractionary fiscal policy would shift it to the left.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Recessions and expansionary fiscal policy 
 
 
                                                 
1 In the word of Keynes (1936:63): 
“Income = value of output = consumption + investment 
Saving = income – consumption 
Therefore, saving = investment” 
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During a recession, the growth of nominal GDP is less than the growth of potential GDP (YN < 
YP). When this occurs, the government can boost aggregate demand by increasing spending or 
decreasing tax. Holding all else constant, AD curve will shift right. When actual GDP equals 
potential GDP (YN = YP); the gap between actual GDP and potential GDP is 0. The economy is 
now operating at its potential level. A recession is resolved.  
 
Figure 2.2 Booms and contractionary fiscal policy   
 
 
During an expansion, the growth of nominal GDP exceeds the economy’s capacity to produce (YN 
> YP). When this occurs, the government may impose higher tax rates or reduce expenditure to 
bring the economy back to its potential level, avoiding high inflation and instability. Holding all 
else constant, AD curve will shift left; equilibrium GDP moves back to its natural rate. 
 
The national income accounting entity susgests that fiscal policy component (G) in equation (1) 
can be adjusted to manage the overall state of the economy. However, Holcombe (2004) argues 
that, because (G) is measured at cost rather than at market value, the bias toward increasing size 
of the government sector is inevitable. Further, (Y) is measured as homogenous aggregate demand, 
this leads to the bias towards quantity of outputs, while the measure of economic progress should 
be based on quality: “Economic progress comes partly from increases in the amount of output…but 
economic progress mostly is the result of changes in the nature of the goods and services the 
economy produces” (Holcombe, 2004). 
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2.2  Components of fiscal policy 
 
From a theoretical and methodological point of view, fiscal policy can be decomposed into 
“discretionary” and “automatic” part. Discretionary fiscal policy refers to the government’s 
deliberate measures to adjust public spending or the level of taxation to stabilize fluctuations in 
economic activity. Discretionary fiscal policy is hence the “intentional” stabilizers. Automatic 
stabilization, on the other hand, refers to the governments' budget components (e.g., income taxes 
and welfare programs) that automatically adjusted to fluctuations in economic activity.2 Because 
they act in such a way to smooth out output fluctuations automatically, the name “automatic” 
stablizers came along.   
 
Fatas and Mihov (2009) further defines a discretionary fiscal policy theoretically as a combination 
of three elements: automatic stabilizers, exogenous discretionary fiscal policy, and endogenous 
discretionary fiscal policy. Automatic stabilizers smooth out the cycles and are automatically 
triggered by the tax codes and spending rules. Exogenous discretionary fiscal policy refers to a 
change in spending or revenue that is not induced by the macroeconomic environment, whereas, 
the endogenous discretionary fiscal policy includes changes in spending or revenue in response to 
changing economic conditions. 
 
2.2.1 Discretionary fiscal policy as a stabilization tool  
 
Discretionary fiscal policy can be either countercyclical, procyclical, or acyclical to the movement 
of the business cycle. A countercyclical discretionary fiscal policy is a policy that is expasionary 
during recessions and contractionary during booms. By contrast, procyclicality occurs when 
discretionary fiscal policy is contractive during downturns, and expansive during upturns, 
intensifying output fluctuations. Acyclicality refers to situation when discretionary fiscal policy 
does not move in accordance with the state of the economy. This occurs when discretionary fiscal 
policy, such as the level of government’s expenditure, remains constant over the business cycle 
(neither expansionary or contractionary). 
 
                                                 
2
 because tax revenues tend to be broadly proportional to GDP, while government expenditure tend to be independent 
of the business cycles (except for some items such as unemployment benefits). 
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By design, tax revenues and automatic stabilization are procyclical variables, as it automatically 
increases during booms and decreases during recession. When this procyclical component is netted 
out from the overall balance, what left is the fiscal policy that is discretionary and countercyclical.   
On the other hand, discretionary fiscal policy can be designed to be countercyclical to stabilize the 
business cycles, or either procyclical or acyclical to boost growth or curb inflation without 
concerning about the fluctuations. As such, discretionary fiscal policy as a macroeconomic 
stabilization tool should be a countercyclical variable.  
 
Discretionary fiscal policy can also be more or less effective because of a concept known as the 
“multiplier effect”. The fiscal multiplier measures the impact of discretionary fiscal policy on 
output in the short-term. As the fiscal multiplier gives an additional shift in AD as people spend a 
portion of their income and save the rest, the size of the effect is depends on the saving/spending 
ratio. The size of fiscal multiplier is therefore determined by the consumer’s marginal decision to 
save. If the marginal propensity to save is small, the multiplier will have a large effect, i.e., a little 
change in government spending can result into to a substantial change in total output. Formally, 
the impact of fiscal multiplier is simply defined as “the ratio of a change in output (Y) to a 
discretionary change in government spending (G) or tax revenue (T)” (Batini et al., 2014): 
 
     Impact multiplier = 
Y𝑡
G𝑡
 
 
Where t can be a quarter or a year depending on the frequency of the data that is used in the study.  
 
In theories, the mechanism behind fiscal policy may sound easy. Yet, the application of fiscal 
policy in practice is problematic for several reasons. First, uncertain lags and timing are those 
major concerns when implementing an active fiscal policy. How often should government adjust 
fiscal policy to fine-tune the economy keeping it near the potential rate? “Almost all economists, 
including most Keynesians, now believe that the government simply cannot know soon enough to 
fine-tune successfully. Three lags make it unlikely that fine-tuning will work. First, there is a lag 
between the time that a change in policy is required and the time that the government recognizes 
this. Second, there is a lag between when the government recognizes that a change in policy is 
required and when it takes action. The third lag comes between the time that policy is changed and 
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when the changes affect the economy” (Blinder, 2008). Because of these lags, the timing of active 
fiscal policy to fine-tune the economy is a very difficult task.  By the time the policy becomes 
effective, the state of the economy may have already changed.  A fiscal policy intended to be 
countercyclical may turn out to be procyclical if an economist gives an inaccurate assessment of 
the current and future state of the economy.   
 
Second, application of active fiscal policy can also be problematic in cases where the government’s 
budgets that are not fiscally sustainable. Fiscal sustainability refers to “the government’s ability to 
maintain its current policies and satisfy its lifetime budget constraint without defaulting on its debt 
obligations.” (Burnside, 2005:6). Operationally, public debt should not be a concern for fiscal 
sustainability issue if the country is a monetary sovereign and does not owe too much in foreign-
denominated currencies to the extent it cannot pay back. However, in cases where countries heavily 
relied on external sources of funding, whether it is the IMF or ECB3, a sovereign downgrade rating  
would put substantial question on the government's ability to spend wisely the liquidity they are 
not able to create.4  
 
2.2.2 Automatic stabilizers as stabilization tool 
 
To a great extent, a working tax system always serves as an automatic stabilizer. When the 
economy grows fast (wages rise), revenue from taxes for government also increases, subtracting 
money from the circular flow and reduce inflationary pressure. This automatic function also works 
during a recession, as automatic stabilizers provide the first line of defense, leaving more credits 
to the private sector through the tax structure and social welfare programs. Automatic stabilizers 
are not subjected to time lags, providing the first line of defense during economic downturns and 
upturns, requiring no change in existing laws and legislations. Automatic stabilizers always 
respond in a “timely, foreseeable and symmetrical manner” over the business cycle, moderating 
the overheating during booms and supporting economic activity during recessions (Debrun & 
Kapoor, 2010). The better the structure and design of automatic stabilizer, the smaller the potential 
need for deliberate fiscal measures. 
                                                 
3 e.g., Latin America debt crisis in 1970s, Greece government-debt crisis since late 2009 
4 In many cases, declare bankruptcy on debt migh be considered as the best solution.  
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On the other hand, utilization of automatic stabilizers in macroeconomic planning could be 
restricted for the following reasons. First, the benefits brought about by automatic stabilizers are 
often insufficient in the context of large demand shocks. The reason for this might be that the 
spending or tax categories that reinforce the working of automatic stabilizers are not designed 
primarily for stabilization function. Rather, they are designed in the first instance to deliver 
economic equity or efficiency, with output stabilizing arising as a side benefit. Adjusting the 
underlying fiscal variables for stabilization purposes at large would disrupt the allocative and 
redistributive branches of government policy. 
 
Second, Alesina (2000) finds that in cases where state revenues endogenously respond to asset 
price cycles, automatic stabilization does not necessarily synchronize with the business cycle. In 
cases where countries largely relied on oil revenue, for instance, a boom in international oil price 
when the domestic economy is slowing down may induce the swings in the business cycle rather 
than stabilize them, distort the effect of automatic stabilizers. 
 
Finally, when designing tax codes and spending rules that serve as automatic stabilizers, 
policymakers should also consider the future impact of unfunded liabilities (i.e.: retirement 
benefits), as they may put substantial stress on public finances. Auerbach (2012) argues that “even 
if existing programs can be modified, a growing share of government budgets will be devoted to 
old-age entitlement programs, and both economics and politics suggest that this will reduce the 
flexibility of budget determinations.” The design of tax policy, hence, should take into account the 
dynamic developments of demography and migration to make sure the automatic stabilization 
function will work well in the long run. 
 
2.3 Rules for fiscal policy 
 
Before the Great Depression, the only accepted rule for fiscal policy was that government budget 
should not be adjusted in response to changes in the level of economic activity. Governments were 
“almost universally condemned as irresponsible if expenditures exceeded tax ravenues except for 
accidental reasons. That is to say, deficits were not purposely allowed to occur in normal periods. 
Deficit financing was admitted to be unavoidable during times of war, but in non war periods 
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governments were careful to preserve financial integrity, a term which was held to be almost 
synonymous with the annually balanced budget” (Buchanan, 1960:115). Because this widely held 
view, the role of fiscal policy must rest with either the monetary policy or upon the automatic 
stabilizations: “automatic or quasi-automatic adjusting devices were expected to come into play 
and to prevent severe depressions or severe inflations.” (ibid:116). Before Keynes, annually 
balanced budget was a norm.  
 
After Keynes’s “General Theory,” this norm seemed to be neglected. Large fiscal budget deficits 
for stabilization purpose became more acceptable after Keynes show that if no action is taken by 
the government to revive effective demand, the economy may fall into a permanent recession. If 
deficits by the public sector is a good thing for the private sector as suggested by Keynes, the 
question is, to what extent government can run a deficit? Indefinitely? 
 
Abba Lerner, a Russian-born British economist, proposed an interesting though somewhat extreme 
proposition of what is known as “functional finance” – the backbone of modern monetary theory 
and Post-Keynesian economics. Lerner's work on public finance emphasizes the importance of 
budget deficit in stabilizing business cycles, maintaining that the budget should be in deficit at all 
times to keep output, employment, and prices at desired level (Lerner, 1943). In fact, there is no 
need for the government to balance the budget for any fiscal year. “Budget balance might be the 
result, but it should never be the aim, of budgetary planning” (Buchanan, 1960:124). In theory, the 
ultimate purpose of taxation is to control inflation, not in itself a source of income for the 
government, because the government can always create money at wish to pay for its debt 
denominated in its currency.5  
 
It is necessary to note that at this point the world was still under the gold standard, the “barbarous 
relic” in the words of Keynes (1924:172), that restrained governments from macroeconomic 
engineering.  James M. Buchanan, a Nobel laureate, wrote “the public finances” in 1960 when the 
greenback was still pegged to gold, yet he realized the merits of Lerner’s argument: “There seems 
no doubt that functional finance would be the best of the three rules if the economy were to be 
                                                 
5 Taxes can also be used to redistribute income (progressive income tax), deliver social justice (fines), protect people 
(“sin” taxes – tax on wine, cigarettes, etc.) 
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guided by a single decision-making agency, a despot, benevolent or otherwise. But this sort of 
decision making cannot, and should not, exist in a democratic society” (Buchanan, 1960:125).  
 
USD 20 trillion.6 That’s about the amount of US public debt at this point, and the Trump 
administration is planning to spend more and cut tax further. Furthermore, US’s government 
spending shows no sign of declining after WWII.7 Evidently, functional finance, characterized by 
consistently large budget deficits over a long time, has become a formula for macroeconomists 
after the collapse of Bretton Wood system regardless a country is a democracy or autocracy. 
Nowadays, with a floating exchange rate regime, a monetary sovereign is not revenue-constrained 
(but could be credit-restrained by the public and the existing legal framework). As long as such 
monetary sovereign can create new fiat money which they have the monopoly upon and demand 
for that fiat money still exists, the only concern should be the inflationary force that withdraws the 
purchasing power from the hardworking people by inflating away their saving accounts. Leave 
politics aside, the budget deficit might not a bad strategy for the sovereign government with its 
own currency and central bank, if price level can be kept stable with monetary policies.  
 
2.4 Critics of discretionary fiscal policy  
 
The 1970s was a hard time for discretionary fiscal policy. To explain stagflation, several schools 
of economics emerged simultaneously, questioned the effectiveness of discretionary fiscal policy 
in achieving its output stabilization function. 
 
The question in focus had support from theoretical contributions of consumer theory and the 
Austrian school of economics, whose models rigorously built on the so-called “rational expectation 
revolution”. Early theoretical models by Lucas (1973, 1976), Barro (1974), as well as Sargent and 
Wallace (1975), introduced and formalized the concept of consumer’s expectations into 
macroeconomic models, at the same time raised serious doubts about the effectiveness of Keynes’s 
effective demand management policies.  
 
                                                 
6 http://www.usdebtclock.org/ 
7 http://www.usfederalbudget.us/past_spending 
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Friedman’s (1957) permanent income hypothesis as one of the main pillars of consumer theory set 
out to attack the concept of fiscal multipliers and the effectiveness of discretionary fiscal policy in 
Keynes’ model. The permanent income hypothesis simply states that rational economic agents 
tend to expect their income to fall in the future for any deficit spent or tax cut at status quo.  These 
agents will thus rationally respond by saving a larger portion of their income in expectation of a 
future tax hike. In other words, if the marginal propensity to consume of transitory income is small, 
the fiscal multiplier would have much lower impact on aggregate demand than previously 
described in the Keynesian model. 
 
Similar to Friedman’s hypothesis, the life-cyle theory of saving maintains that consumers are also 
forward-looking, meaning the household's consumption level now depends on the household's 
lifetime wealth expectations (Ando and Modigliani, 1963). In this model, a discretionary measure 
will only “boost aggregate demand to the extent that consumers do not anticipate that the debt will 
be repaid in their lifetime” (Chouraqui, 1990). The shorter the time horizon upon which life-cycle 
consumers base their decisions, the more likely it is that short-run discretionary fiscal policy will 
be effective. When consumers behave dynastically to a full extent, in a way that they not only think 
about saving for their retirement but also for their children and grandchildren, the Ricardian 
Equivalence could occur. Under this condition, fiscal policy has no effect at all on the level of 
output, since any increase in spending now would fully translate into an equal amount saving by 
rational consumers who expect taxes to increase.   
 
While Keynes perceives most of the output fluctuations as unwanted, the Austrian school of 
economics, whose work very much influenced by F.A. Hayek (1933) and Joseph Schumpeter 
(1961), Ludwig Von Mises (Mises et al., 1996)), sees these cycles as an inevitable result of an 
evolutionary social system with rational economic agents and imperfect information. Schumpeter 
termed this feedback loop as “creative destruction,” whereby economic activity always adapts to 
“real” factors, such as technological innovations, changes in modes of organization, and 
international competitiveness. In a Schumpeter’s model of creative restructuring, “production 
factors must be reallocated away from contracting activities and into newly expanding ones” 
(Dreze 2001:182). From the perspective of neoclassical growth theory, these supply-side, 
independent parameters (i.e.: the Harrod-Domar model) already included, in the words of Sollow 
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(in Dreze 2001:20): the psychological and sociological propensity to save, technologically 
determined capital intensity, the demography and sociology of the labour force, and the rate of 
innovation.  
 
Here, across Classical and New Classical arguments, what matters most is how productivity, the 
true engine of growth, can be improved in the long run, and they assert that with self-correcting 
mechanism prices are always moving towards new equilibriums. In a Classical world without 
market failures, a discretionary fiscal measure would likely to paralyze the invisible hand, and for 
that reason, “the world that they describe quite plainly needs no macroeconomic policy” (Hahn 
1985:75).8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
8 Hahn (1985:75) continuted, “Keynesians were concerned with the problem of pushing the economy back to its 
natural rate, not beyond it. If the economy is there already, we can all go home”. 
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3. State of the Art in the Literature 
 
In theory, optimal fiscal policy should be either countercyclical or acyclical. In the neoclassical 
theories, Barro’s (1979) “tax-smoothing” hypothesis suggests that, for a given path of spending, 
tax rates should be stable over the output cycle, and the automatic stabilization should move in a 
procyclical fashion. However, in Keynesian theory, if the economy in recession, fiscal policy can 
be useful to bring the economy back to its full employment rate by serving as a countercyclical 
stabilization tool. 
 
In practice, a vast range of literature has suggested that fiscal policy is often procyclical in 
developing countries. Gavin and Perotti (1997) first found out fiscal policy’s procyclicality in 13 
Latin American countries. Talvi and Vegh (2000) later observed that procyclicality was not only 
the problem in Latin America, but other developing countries across the world also follow this 
pattern. In particular, Lane’s analysis (2003), through a panel data of 46 countries globally, shows 
that most Caribbean countries were procyclical as well. Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2005), 
with a paper titled “When it rains, it pours: Procyclical Capital Flows and Macroeconomic 
Policies”, provided the most data intensive evidence across 104 developing countries. They 
observed that fiscal policy was procyclical in most developing countries, especially in middle-high 
income countries. This finding was further supported by Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) based on 
quarterly data from 46 countries during 1960-2006. At this point, there has been an established 
consensus among economists that fiscal policy in many, though not all, developing countries are 
procyclical.9 
 
Many of the mentioned papers above also attempted to find out the reasons behind this puzzle. The 
two main reasons are:   
 
1) Credit constraints: during booms, poor countries can borrow more easily and they tend 
to do so to run a budget deficit. In bad times, poor countries cannot borrow, or can do 
                                                 
9 Also, Catao and Suton (2002), Manasse (2006) 
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so only at very high interest rates. This may explain why government’s spending is 
often procyclical (Gavin & Perotti, 1997 ; Kaminsky et al., 2005). 
 
2) Political constraints: when more resources are available, the common-pool problem is 
more severe. The fight over common resources intensifies (“the voracity effect”), 
leading to more public spending and larger fiscal deficit (Lane and Tornell (1998), Lane 
(2003)). Following the “starve the Leviathan government” argument, Alesina and 
Tabellini (2005) pointed out that procyclicality emerges in a democratic system 
because voters try to hold their corrupt governments accountable, therefore in booms 
they demand higher utility for themselves, forcing the government to run a budget 
deficit (de Granado, Gupta and Hajdenberg 2013).  
 
Recent papers in political economy also found convincing evidence of mechanisms behind the 
procyclical conduct of fiscal policy. Woo (2009) suggests that social polarization plays an 
important part in shaping the volatility behavior of fiscal policy over the business cycles. In line 
with political distortions proposal, recent research by Carneiro and Garrido (2015) found that 
institutional quality drives cyclicality of fiscal policy, based on a sample of 180 countries around 
the world. The article is innovative in a way that the authors account for endogeneity problem by 
using the Acemoglu et al.’s (2011) white-settlers data as an instrument for institutional quality. It 
was also pointed out by Cicek and Elgin (2010) that fiscal policy in countries with a larger size of 
shadow economy is more likely to be procyclical, based on a sample of 78 countries. Overall, there 
is substantial evidence in cross-country literature showing that procyclicality is the result of poor 
institution and bad governance.  
 
A study by Frankel, Vegh, and Vuletin (2013) however points out a reversal trend recently. The 
paper summarized the trend in fiscal cyclicality in 21 developed countries and 73 developing 
countries over two periods, 1960-1999 and 2000-2009. Similar to earlier research, the paper found 
significant statistical evidence that developing countries are mostly procyclical, while the most 
developed ones are countercyclical during 1960-1999. However, this situation seems to reverse 
during 2000-2009. Many developing countries have graduated from procyclical fiscal policy, 
whereas some developed countries converted their countercyclical fiscal policy into procyclical.  
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Recent findings in a Bank of International Settlements working paper also found that fiscal policy 
became more countercyclical during the Great Recession in Latin America, but they have turned 
procyclical again over the past few years (Alberola et al. 2016). In fact, research focus on single 
country’s fiscal behavior has found that fiscal policy follows a familiar pattern. For instance, 
Ghosh and Misra (2014) found that fiscal policy in India has been procyclical over an extended 
period; however, procyclicality tends to be replaced by more countercyclical measures in response 
to the global economic downturn 2008-09. Interestingly, Koirala (2015) suggests that 
countercyclicality also occurred in developing country like Nepal, but only strong during the 
2000s, while there is a mild procyclicality during the period 2011-13. 
 
In the case of Vietnam, Thien and Hoi (2016) and Nguyen H.T.K. (2016) are the only two papers 
that focus on the issue of fiscal policy cyclicality, but their conclusions are not clear cut. Before 
these papers, an early study conducted by Erbil (2011) for 28 developing oil-producing countries 
during 1990-2009 which include Vietnam in the sample also attempted to find out the cyclical 
behavior of fiscal policy. The results suggested that all of the fiscal variables in the models are 
strongly procyclical, especially in low-income group where Vietnam belongs. He further found 
that for this group the quality of institutions and political structure appear to be significant in 
determining the cyclicality of fiscal policy. 
 
In a single-country analysis,  by analyzing the changes in various indicators: economic growth, 
inflation, budget deficit, public expenditure and the size of government bonds market, Thien and 
Hoi (2016) concluded that Vietnam had ineffective procyclical fiscal policy in the past, and hence 
they proposed a more countercyclical approach by institutionalizing a new state’s budget 
management rule. 
 
Another research in this field for Vietnam was conducted by Nguyen H.T.K. (2016). In this article, 
she pointed out that the work by Thien and Hoi (2016) seems “less convincing without any 
statistically significant evidence.” The author instead used the Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
models to assess the cyclicality of government spending over the period 1990-2014. The results 
show that the current fiscal balance depends on the previous year fiscal balance, but the effects are 
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only moderate. The short-run dynamic structure further suggests that Foreign Direct Investment 
negatively correlates with fiscal balance, but the impact direction of growth and debt on fiscal 
balance is not conclusive in the short run. About the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy, the author 
hardly finds any conclusive outcome, but mostly favor procyclicality. 
 
 
Research has shown that fiscal policy in developing countries is often procyclical, due to various 
reasons such as political constraints, imperfect credit market and institution, but this pattern 
seemed to reverse recently. Vietnam is not an exception to this phenomenom, as research found 
that various fiscal indicators for Vietnam also procyclical, but the evidence is either weak (Thien 
and Hoi, 2016) or inconclusive (Nguyen H.T.K. 2016). To close this gap in literature, this research 
asked the question of procyclicality again and went one step further to include inflation in the 
model and netted out the effect of automatic stabilizers from fiscal policy using the IMF approach 
to compute the cyclically adjusted balance. 
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4. Methodology 
 
 
The data for Vietnam from 1990 to 2015 are collected from Asian Development Bank, 
International Monetary Fund, and World Bank. Time series data on general government’s 
expenditure, revenue and overall balance for 1990-2015 are retrieved from Asian Development 
Bank. Data for GDP at current prices (in local currency unit), and CPI are extracted from the World 
Bank’s resources. The inflation series for Vietnam from 1980 is obtained from International 
Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook database. All nominal prices are deflated with GDP 
deflator before analysis. Data in real prices are standardized before regression analysis. Software 
used for data preparation, analysis and presentation include Microsoft Excel and R. 
 
To assess the cyclicality of discretionary fiscal policy over the business cycle, the following steps 
are proposed. First, estimates of output gap as a proxy for business cycles are extracted by time 
linear and Hodrick-Prescott filter. The linear detrending method calculates potential GDP as a 
function of time, whereas HP-filter provides the estimate of output gap by solving the minimization 
problem on the original GDP series. Next, the cyclically adjusted balance (CAB) as an indicator 
for discretionary fiscal policy (the component of the budget that does not respond to business 
cycles) is constructed following the methodology described in the IMF technical guide and manual 
(Fedelino et al., 2009). The change in CAB further gives the measure of fiscal impulse. By 
construction, a positive value of fiscal impulse implies an expansive discretionary fiscal policy 
compared to a benchmark year, whereas a negative value suggests a contractive action by the 
government compared to the benchmark. In this study, the point of reference for fiscal impulse is 
the previous year. Finally, by regressing output gap, inflation and lagging fiscal variables on fiscal 
impulse and selected control variables, the relationship between these variables shall be revealed. 
The following section describes the above steps in detail.  
 
 
 
 
 21 
4.1 Estimating potential GDP and output gap 
 
Measuring potential GDP and its deviation from real (or nominal) GDP as an indicator of output 
gap is the first step for determining when and how much discretionary fiscal policy is needed. 
When real GDP is higher than potential GDP, price level is likely to increase because effective 
demand exceeds the capacity of economy to produce. Vice versa, when real GDP is lower than 
potential GDP, the output gap is negative, a recession is likely to occur. The conception of output 
gap is therefore to quantitatively measure the deviation of real GDP from its trend, the level of 
output an economy can potentially produce in the long run. Any large deviation from this long-
term trend indicates the need for government to intervene with fiscal measures.  
 
Researches in business cycle theory have developed a number of methods to estimate potential 
GDP, however, each method of estimation can yield quite distinctive results. Since no methods 
can be argued to be superior than others, it is recommended to use different detrending techniques 
and then compare them to each other  (Nguyen Ngoc Anh, 2013).  
 
4.1.1 Time Dentrending  
 
Time linear detrending is a simple method to obtain the trend from a time series. This approach 
assumes potential output is a function of time, and the residuals are the deviation of real output 
from potential output. Potential output is estimated with the following equation: 
 
Yt* = 0 + 1trend  
 
Where, Yt* is potential output, 1 is the parameter estimated by the linear model with the 
assumption that potential output is a function of time. In practice, time linear detrend is often 
applied to detrend the logarithm of real GDP series. The main advantage of time detrend method 
is its simplicity in the calculation. However, a significant disadvantage is that it assumes that there 
is a constant, time linear trend. For that reason, the cycles extracted from this method would likely 
to ignore small the fluctuations in the real GDP series. 
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4.1.2 The Hodrick-Prescott filter  
 
The Hodrick and Prescott (1980) filter (henceforth, HP-filter) is also a standard technique to 
remove the fluctuations from time series data. The HP-filter removes a smooth trend 𝜏t from a time 
series yt by solving the minimization problem with respect to a variable 𝜏t  (Ravn & Uhlig, 2010): 
 
  
 
Where λ is a user-defined parameter that penalizes the fluctuations in second differences of 𝑥t 
(ibid). A higher λ implies a higher loss for trying to approximate the trend, and hence a more 
pronounced cycle. As λ  0, the estimated trend is identical to the real series (yt). As λ  , the 
estimated trend becomes more identical to a linear trend.  
 
In adjusting HP-filter’s smoothing parameter for annual data, different rules has been suggested. 
The smoothing parameter for quarterly data is agreed to be 1600, but for annual data, there are a 
number of proposals. First, by multiplying the value of λ for quarterly data (1600) with the square 
of the alternative sampling frequency, Backus and Kehoe (1992) suggests the value of 100 for 
annual data, which is widely used across literature. Second, Cooley and Ohanian (1991) suggests 
to set  = 400 by adjusting the smoothing parameter linearly with the frequency of data. Finally, a 
recent article by Ravn & Uhlig (2010) suggests that one should adjust the smoothing parameter to 
the fourth power of the observation frequency ratios, and hence a proposed value of 6.25 for annual 
data. Following these proposals, I adjust the smoothing parameter to be 100 and 6.25, and keep in 
mind that the larger the value of smoothing parameter, the smoother the trend, the more 
pronounced output gap.10 It is also important to note that I also adjusted the smoothing parameter 
to be 400 as suggested by Cooley and Ohanian (1991), but this value seems too large; when 
applying to detrend real GDP series this approach seemed to produce artifical business cycles, and 
therefore the result is not included here.  
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The obtained values of output gap by three approaches presented above are then used as input to 
compute the cyclically adjusted balance (CAB). The purpose of the CAB is to show how the budget 
would look like if the effects of business cycles are netted out. The next section describes the 
methodology to obtain CAB.   
 
4.2 Computing cyclically adjusted balance  
 
To compute the cyclically adjusted balance (CAB) for Vietnam, the paper follows the 
methodology described in the IMF Technical Notes and Manual (Fedelino et al., 2009). The overall 
balance is decomposed into into cyclical and cyclically adjusted components, with the assumption 
of unitary elasticities for government’s revenue and zero elasticity for expenditure. This is also 
known as the aggregated approach (when elasticities are used to measure the sensitivity of total 
revenue and spending to the output gap), in contrast with the disaggregated method proposed the 
OECD (with elasticities specific to various revenue and expenditure items) (ibid). 
 
From a methodological point of view, the overall balance can be decomposed into a cyclically 
adjusted and cyclical component:  
 
OB = CAB + CB  11       (1) 
  
Where, OB is the overall balance, CAB is the cyclically adjusted balance, CB is the cyclical 
balance. The purpose of computing cyclically adjusted balance is to show the underlying position 
of fiscal policy, the exogenous component, after endogenous component is removed.  
 
Since the changes in one side of our equation equal the change in another, the change in overall 
balance can be written as: 
 
OB = CAB + CB − INT       (2) 
 
                                                 
11 The overall balance is by definition the government’s net revenue:  OB = R - G 
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where CAB is the changes in cyclically adjusted balance, CB is the changes in cyclical balance, 
INT is the changes in interest payment. Interest payments are often separated from analysis 
because they are not correlated with cyclical changes. Excluding interest payment from (1) gives: 
  
CAB = OB − CB       (3) 
 
The changes in CAB is the difference between the changes in OB and CB. Changes in cyclical 
balance represent the impact of cyclical component - the automatic stabilizer, wherease changes 
in CAB indicate the intended contribution of discretionary fiscal policy on the domestic demand.  
 
As OB is known (the difference between revenue and expenditure) and CAB can be calculated, 
the CB will be the difference between OB and CAB: CB = OB - CAB. Obtaining CAB requires an 
estimate of the output gap and elasticities of revenue/expenditure to the output gap. Output gap is 
the difference between actual and potential output: 
 
gap = 
Y−Y∗
Y∗
        (4) 
 
Where, Y is actual output and Y* is potential output, gap is output gap, often expressed as 
percentage of potential GDP. To estimate potential output, linear detrending and HP-filter have 
been applied. 
 
After getting cyclically adjusted revenue and cyclically adjusted expenditure separately, the 
difference of them yields CAB: 
 
CAB = RCA – GCA        (5) 
 
Cyclically adjusted revenues can be obtained by adjusting actual revenues for the effect of the 
deviation of potential from actual output, with the revenue elasticity R,Y defining the size of the 
cyclical effect:  
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RCA = R(
Y∗
Y
)
R,Y
       (6) 
 
Where, RCA is cyclically adjusted revenue, R is nominal revenue and R,Y is the elasticity of 
expenditure with respect to the output gap. This is based on the assumption that the ratio of 
cyclically adjusted revenue to actual revenue moves together with the ratio of potential output to 
actual output:  
𝑅𝐶𝐴
𝑅
= (
𝑌∗
𝑌
)
𝑅,𝑌
. Under the assumption of unitary revenue (R,Y = 1), equation (6) can 
be rewritten as:  
 
RCA = R(
Y∗
Y
)        (7) 
 
Cyclically adjusted expenditures can be obtained likewise: 
 
 GCA = G(
Y∗
Y
)
G,Y
       (8) 
 
Where, GCA is cyclically adjusted expenditure, G is nominal expenditure and G,Y is the elasticity 
of expenditure with respect to the output gap. Under the assumption of a zero expenditure 
elasticity, G,Y = 0, cyclically adjusted expenditure is equal to actual expenditure, GCA = G,  in 
which the business cycle does not trigger any response in expenditure levels and the cyclical 
expenditure component is zero. This is based on the assumption that expenditure is viewed as 
discretionary in its entirety, and thus independent from the business cycle. While this may provide 
be a reasonal approximation in some cases, in practice, some expenditure items (such as welfare 
spending) may exhibit a cyclical pattern. 
 
From (5), (7) and (8), the cyclically adjusted overall balance (CAB) can be rewritten as: 
 
CAB = R(
Y∗
Y
)
R,Y
 -  G(
Y∗
Y
)
G,Y
      (9) 
 
Following the finding of OECD estimates (Fedelino et al., 2009), we also assume unitary elasticity 
of revenue (as revenue is positively related to GDP) and zero elasticity of expenditure (most 
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expenditure items except few are not related to GDP). With aggregate revenue and expenditure 
elasticities can be assume to be 1 for revenues and 0 for expenditures, (9) becomes:  
 
CAB = R(
Y∗
Y
) – G        (10) 
 
The cyclically adjusted balance is, by construction, free of economic fluctuations. Changes in CAB 
can quantify the impact of discretionary fiscal policy on the economy. A widening in CAB implies 
an expansionary fiscal policy stance, or in other words, to an intended positive contribution of 
discretionary fiscal policy to aggregate demand (Bornhorst et al., 2011). Following this logic, fiscal 
impulse as the indicator of discretionary fiscal policy is methodologically constructed as: 
 
FS = -CAB,        (11) 
FI = FS = FSt – FSt-1  12     (12) 
 
where:  FS is fiscal stance 
FI > 0 implies expansionary discretionary fiscal policy stance 
FI < 0 implies contractionary discretionary fiscal policy stance 
FI = 0 implies neutral fiscal policy stance 
 
Fiscal impulse (FS) is the first difference between 2 periods, the change in CAB from one year 
to another. Discretionary fiscal policy is said to be expansionary if CAB widens (FI>0), 
contractionary if CAB contracts (FI<0).  
 
 
4.3 Regression analysis  
 
Given discretionary fiscal policy reacts to the output gap, we can summarize the behavior of 
discretionary fiscal policy from an econometric point of view by using a regression model as 
follows: 
                                                 
12
 Fiscal indicators should be scaled to potential GDP (Fedelino et al., 2009) 
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FI =  + gap + FIt-1 +       
 
Where FI is fiscal impulse– a measure of discretionary fiscal policy,  is the constant,  gap is 
output gap, and  is error term. FIt-1 is one-period lagged fiscal impulse as a percent of potential 
GDP, a control variable account for the persistence in fiscal balances. The regression model 
follows the idea that policymakers are motivated by the goals of output stabilization (fiscal impulse 
should respond countercyclically to output gap) and fiscal sustainability (if deficit in previous year 
was too high, deficit in current year should be reduced). The cyclicality of discretionary fiscal 
policy is determined by looking at the sign and size of the coefficient . In particular, when >0, 
FI is procyclical to output gap; countercyclical when <0; and acyclical if =0.  
 
To test the hypothesis if discretionary fiscal policy respond to price level, inflation is also 
incorporated into the model as followed: 
 
FI =  + gap + inflation + FIt-1 +      
 
Where, inflation is the first difference between 2 periods, an indicator that captures the change 
in inflation.   
 
Following the finding that Vietnam’s fiscal policy has been more countercyclical in recent years 
(Pham The Anh, 2013), a new variable is created to see whether the discretionary fiscal policy has 
been countercyclical or procyclical since 2008. A dummy variable was created, D2008, which 
takes the value of 1 for every year since 2008, 0 elsewhere. Multiplying this interaction variable 
with output gap (D2008*gap), we have a proxy discretionary fiscal policy since 2008.  
 
Likewise, to find out whether fiscal policy reacts differently to different phases of the cycle I 
created two interaction variables: RECESSION (1 for negative output gap; 0 otherwise) and 
BOOM (1 for positive output gap; 0 otherwise). RECSSION*gap similarly takes only the negative 
values from output gap; while BOOM*gap takes only the positive ones.  
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5. The evolution of fiscal policy in Vietnam 
 
After the Vietnam War (1955-1975), the North and South Vietnam was united. The Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam was born in 1975 and followed a centrally planned economy since its 
inception. The economy under central planning and heavy subsidy system was not efficient, 
manifested in weak economic performance, large fiscal deficits and high inflation. To improve the 
economic system, by the end of 1986, the National Assembly of Vietnam passed a comprehensive 
set of legislations, in Vietnamese chính sách Đổi Mới (Doi Moi), to radically transform the 
command economy into a more open, market-oriented one.  
 
5.1 Large fiscal deficits and high inflation before Doi Moi 
 
Fiscal policy before Doi Moi could be described as expansionary for a number of reasons.  First, 
the government budget under central planning acted as “planned distributor and a pool of fund for 
the state sector. All revenues, including companies’ profit, if any, were transferred to the budget; 
and all losses were financed by the budget through direct and indirect measures” (Tran and Pham, 
2003:75). The characteristics of a centrally planned economy made the government budget 
expansionary as a consequence, since government had to use budget expenditure to cover massive 
loss for the inefficient state actors during this period. 
 
Second, hardly any revenue from taxes and fees were collected before 1990 due to the economy’s 
poor performance and an incomplete tax system (Tran and Pham, 2003). The government’s 
revenue relied mainly on two sources: agricultural tax and state capital fees, whereas major tax 
categories such as corporate tax and income tax were non-exist before 1990. Third, even though 
revenue was limited, the demand for government spending was remarkably high to service 
Vietnam’s industrialization process after independence. This enormous gap between revenue and 
expenditure was largely offset by the aid from Soviet countries, allowing the Vietnamese 
government’s budget deficits to remain large for almost 15 years after independence.   
 
Heavily relying on external funding, a sudden drop in capital flow from overseas in the 1980s 
triggered a major shock to the government’s fiscal position. The economic and political 
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polarization during the Cold War and the Vietnam’s position in this context made it difficult for 
Vietnam to borrow from the international creditors such as the IMF or ADB.13 Under this 
circumstance, to keep the economy rolling, the government at the time had no choice but to 
increase the money supply to finance large budget deficits. 
 
Between 1986 and 1990, on average 63 percent of the government’s budget deficit was financed 
by printing money. The result was, no surprisingly, very high rate of inflation. As Table 5.1 shows, 
inflation surged to 454 percent in 1986 and sustained above 300 percent level for two years. 
Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.14  In case of triple-digit inflation, this 
is more likely a monetary event.  
 
Table 5.1. Inflation (1985-1990)   
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Inflation (% change, y-o-y) 92 454 360 374 96 36 
Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF 
 
By the late 1980s, the government realized that financing large fiscal deficits by rapidly expanding 
the money supply in a short time wasn’t a good idea since it brought about high and unexpected 
inflation. To put inflation under control, an appropriate response the Vietnam’s government took 
was to print less money. To finance a deficit without inflating the Vietnamese Dong further the 
government had no choice other than borrowing from or taxing the private sector; whereas 
borrowing from international institutions seemed to be impossible for Vietnam at that time, given 
all the conditions of “structural adjustments” by the IMF. This political and economic situation 
could likely to incentivize the central government to take action to reform the budget revenue to 
finance its spending. 
 
                                                 
13 During this period, Vietnam was isolated regionally by the ASEAN and internationally by the UN and the US 
because of Vietnamese military occupation of Cambodia. The result was economic isolation until c.a 1995 
(Freeman, 1993) 
14 Friedman, M. (1974): “Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon in the sense that it is and 
can be produced only by a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in output.” 
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In general, the budget’s revenue before Doi Moi (1986) accounted for a small share of GDP, due 
to an incomplete tax system and primitive collection procedure. On the other hand, expenditure 
flows relied heavily on the Soviet aid. The sudden fall in external funding in the second half of the 
1980s, therefore, encouraged the government to reform the domestic tax system, to control 
inflation and maintain price stability.  
 
5.2  Tax reforms and high tax collection rate, 1990-2011 
 
Indeed, since the early 1990s, the Vietnamese government took various actions to improve the tax 
system. The first phase of tax reform started at the beginning of the 1990s when the National 
Assembly passed important tax laws applying to various economic sectors and their components 
(Nguyen Van Phung, 2015). The modern tax system included important tax categories, such as 
Special Consumption Tax, Personal Income Tax, Corporate Income Tax. Fiscal decentralization 
further helped tax collection procedures become more efficient, withdrawing excessive money 
circulating within the private sector, at the same time improving the fiscal position of the central 
government. The four phases of tax reform are summarized in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2  Three phases of tax reforms in Vietnam (1990-2010) 
 Time             Main developments 
First phase  1990-1995 • SCT and agricultural land use tax, housing and land tax, 
income tax on high earners, license tax, fees and charges 
were introducted in the first phase of tax reform.  
• Main tax pillars include profit tax and turnover tax.  
Second 
phase  
1996-2005 • Modern tax categories were introduced: VAT and CIT, 
while SCT was amended to include more goods and 
services.  
• Fiscal decentralization was implemented during this 
period. In particular, the first State Budget Law was 
approved in 1996 and later revised in 1998. 
•  A new State Budget Law was approved in 2002, under 
which subnational governments (provinces, districts and 
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communes) are granted the rights to collect tax on behalf 
of the central government, make taxing more efficiently.15 
Third phase 2005-2010 • Revised VAT (2008) and SCT (2005, 2008). Opening tax 
base by reducing the numbers of goods and services 
which are VAT exempted, whille expand the application 
of SCT to private yatch and jet.  
• Import taxes were further reduced to meet the 
requirement of WTO. CIT and PIT were also reformed in 
2007 and 2008. 
• Other tax categories were also introduced, such as natural 
resource tax (2009), non-agricultural land use tax (2010), 
environment protection tax (2010). 
Sources: Nguyen Van Phung (2015), Nguyen and Anwar (2011) 
Note: VAT: value-added tax; SCT: special consumption tax; PIT: personal income tax; CIT: corporate income tax 
 
As a result of the first stage of tax reform (1990-1995), revenue from taxes went up from 13 percent 
of GDP in 1991 to 19 percent in 1993 and stayed stable at this level until 1996. However, in 
response to the severe economic slowdown during 1998-2000 triggered by the regional financial 
crisis, the Vietnam government decisively implemented an expansionary fiscal policy through tax 
cuts and a generous package of fiscal stimulus (Tran and Pham, 2003:77-78). Specifically, tax 
revenue was cut down to 16 percent in 1998, while expenditure increased by almost two percentage 
point from 1996 to 1997. But overall, revenues from tax significantly improved from 1991 
onwards, as shown in Figure 5.3. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 However, little autonomy was granted when it comes to spending decisions. Understand the characteristics of 
local conditions, Vietnam’s central government decided to take gradual and cautious steps toward fiscal 
decentralization. The rationale was to limit the possibilities of corruption at local government level, and this is the 
reason put forth by Nguyen and Anwar (2011) to explain why the impact of expenditure decentralization on 
growth is negative in Vietnam.  
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Figure 5.3 Expenditure vs Tax revenue (% of GDP) 
 
Source: ADB 
Note: expenditure is the government’s final expenditure, while tax revenue only includes revenue from taxes and fees.  
 
During 2006-2010, total revenues and grants were quite stable at a high level, around 30 percent 
of GDP on average. Remarkably, a proportion of revenue from crude oil in total budget revenue 
was decreasing gradually, from 6.9 percent in 2007 to 3.1 percent of GDP in 2011 (Pham The Anh, 
2013). Before 2009, government’s revenues from taxes and fees showed no signs of declining. 
State budget final accounts in 2010 demonstrated that such rate remains at 22.3 percent level, but 
from 2012 onwards, tax revenues were significantly reduced to stimulate the domestic economy, 
stood at 19 percent 2013 and 18 percent in 2015.  
 
On the expenditure side, the government budget expenditure was separated (but not completely) 
from state corporate finance, and a hard budget constraint was introduced whereby state companies 
had to be accountable for their business, being responsible for their profits and losses (Tran and 
Pham, 2003:76). The government gradually reduced and eventually eliminated subsidies to SOEs, 
thus substantially reducing current expenditure and financing from the state budget to cover losses 
of these enterprises. However, the result of this reform during this period was limited: the 
government expenditure as a share of GDP consistently rising. During 1990-1993, spending 
averaged 18.6 percent. This figure reached 25 percent in 1993 and remained broadly constant at 
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this level until 1997. Besides, to respond to the adverse effect of the Great Recession, government 
expenditure was increased by almost 2 percent of GDP.   
 
5.3 Fiscal policy in response to the Global Economic Downturn in 2009 
 
In 2009, in order to respond to the global economic downturn accompanied with a number of 
pressures onto the domestic economy, the government of Vietnam implemented various measures 
to prop up aggregate demand, i.e., interest subsidy for small and medium businesses, public 
investment, tax exemption, and social welfare programmes. This stimulus package (almost 10 
percent of GDP) was divided into two parts, the first part was approved and implemented in the 
early 2009, and the second one is the extension of the first package, began from the last quarter of 
2009. In essense, the second stimulus package was introduced to link short and medium term 
economic goals, ensuring the economy continue its recovery path out of the recession, at the same 
time stabilizing macreconomic volatility and secure social welfares in the last months of 2009 and 
early months of 2010.  
 
Table 5.4  Vietnam’s Fiscal stimulus measures 
No. Policy measures Size 
1 Interest subsidy 4% VND 17000 billion 
2 State Development investment  VND 90800 billion 
3 Tax holiday and exemption VND 28000 billion 
4 Other spending for social security and economic 
downturn prevention 
VND   9800 billion 
 Total VND 145600 billion (USD 8 billion) 
Source: Government’s report to the National Assembly (2008) 
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According to the General Statistics Office (2009), Vietnam had recoverd from the global economic 
recession much better than other countries in the region. In particular, GDP increased by 5.3 
percent in 2009, of which growth for the last quarter reached almost 6.9 percent. Inflation declined 
from 23 percent in 2008 to 6.5 percent in 2009. In the first quarter of 2010, Vietnamese economy 
continued to show positive signs of recovery with the growth of gross domestic income reached 
5.8 percent, almost twice as much as as growth in the first quarter of 2009. GDP growth for second 
quarter increased by 6.2 percent, lifting growth for the first 6 months of 2010 to 6.1 percent level 
compared to the previous year. Overall Vietnam has escaped from the global economic downturn 
relatively well.  
 
Apart from its role in recovering the economy from recession, it is important to note some 
problems with this large stimulus program. In terms of policy goals, the main target group for the 
interest subsidy program is small and medium enterprises (SMEs) who need to raise capital and 
expand business activities. But evidence from research shows that commercial banks might be 
benefited from this package the most (Vo, 2010).  
 
According to report from State Bank of Vietnam, by the end of 2009, only 20 percent of SMEs 
received the subsidy from this package (Vo, 2010). Over 51 percent of small and medium 
enterprises operating in Danang city said in a survey that they did not have any access to the interest 
subsidy program, and nearly 30 percent of 400 enterprises surveyed said they were negatively 
affected by the government’s fiscal stimulus package in 2009 (Vo et al., 2009).  The reason is that 
small and medium enterprises, especially small ones find it difficult to access relevant information 
about this package and to meet requirements for loan. To get 4 percent support from the 
government for their loans, businesses must register profit for the past 2 years, no overdue debt 
and no tax arrears. 
 
On the other hand, in 2009, although the Vietnamese economy was still experiencing a lot 
difficulties, the commercial joint stock banks listed on the Vietnamese stock index (HASTC; 
HOSE) posted very high profit, up to several trillion VND (Vo, 2010). This may implies that the 
capital flow from the stimulus package could be driven into speculation. 
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Actual market developments in Vietnam’s stock market in 2009 and the first 7 months of 2010 
also proved this. Vietnam stock market in 2009 grew spectacularly, with an average increase of 
the whole year about 40 percent as shown in Figure 5.5. From the beginning of 2010 until the mid-
2010, despite the Vietnamese economy has shown signs of positive growth, stock market was quite 
quiet. In August 2010, the composite stock price index dropped deep, almost 10 percent from 
previous month high. One of the causes of this development might be that, as the first stimulus 
package ended, cash flow into the stock market plummeted as a result.  
 
Figure 5.5 Composite Stock Price Index  
(weekly average, first week of January 2007=100, local index) 
 
 
Source: ADB 
 
 
5.4 Tax cuts, 2011-2015 
 
 
Since 2011, to revive the economy and push spending among business communites the Vietnamese 
government reduced its budget revenue significantly via the implementenation of various tax 
reduction and tax deferral schemes, especially for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Slower 
economic growth in 2012 (5.2 percent; compared to 6.2 percent in 2011) allowed the government 
to extend its support to SMEs through a series of expansionary measures. In Vietnam, SMEs are 
regarded as the most important economic sector, contributing about 47 percent of GDP and 40 
percent of the State Budget, and accounting for 97 percent of over half a million registered 
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businesses in Vietnam (Nguyen and Sea, 2013).  The revenue cut was therefore meant to be an 
expansionary fiscal policy measure in the short term, revitalizing demand within the domestic 
sectors. 
 
Specifically, the Vietnam’s National Assembly passed Resolution 29 granting various tax reliefs, 
including 30 percent Corporate Income Tax (CIT) reduction in 2012 to eligible SMEs (including 
cooperatives) and labour intensive enterprises (those use a large number of laborers in the areas of 
production, processing of agricultural, forestry and fishery products, footwear and electronic 
components, textiles and garments, and construction of socioeconomic infrastructures). CIT rate 
continued to be lowered in 2013 (25 percent) and 2014 (22 percent) (News, 2017). Moreover, a 
number of tax deferral schemes were introduced, which included: a 9-month deferral of pre-2010 
CIT payments until October 2012, a deferral of 2011 CIT payment to January 2013, a nine-month 
deferral of the VAT liability of June 2012, a six-month deferral for the VAT liability of April and 
May 2012 (Nguyen and Sea, 2013). In addition to the tax cuts granted to SMEs, the Resolution 29 
also giving exemptions to individuals through legislative changes in Personal Income Tax (PIT). 
A tax-free threshold was applied uniformly at USD 220 for the personal and business income, 
instead of being taxed at a flat rate of 5 percent, applied for only six months from July to December 
2012; dividends and investment income were also not subjected to PIT in 2012 (ibid). 
 
When these tax cuts were implemented, they received positive feedbacks from the people and 
business community, for their readiness in response to the economic situation at that time. Not 
only these measures removed difficulties for enterprises in an environment of high inflation, but 
they also helped companies to reduce the capital stress, improved production efficiency, and 
competitiveness of businesses. In essence, these tax reductions were countercyclical discretionary 
fiscal policy, because it made budget revenue components expansionary during a recession, and 
only lasted for a short time.  
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This chapter has discussed the fact that fiscal policy in Vietnam has experienced significant 
developments both on revenue and expenditure side of the budget after Doi Moi. This reflects an 
active use of fiscal policy, through adjustments in spending and tax in responses to the changes in 
the economic environment. Before 1990, under a centrally planned system, expenditure was high, 
but little revenue was collected due to weak economic performance and a primitive tax system. 
This gap was largely offset by the Soviet aid until the mid-1980s. After 1990, on the revenue side, 
the improvements in tax system helped the government to accomplish and maintain a modern and 
efficient tax system, serving as an inflation-curbing tool, at the same time providing more space 
for the central government to increase its spending from 1990 onwards. On the expenditure side, 
indeed, the refinement of taxation secured the government’s position on expansionary 
discretionary fiscal policy throughout the years, incentivized the government to increase spending 
without fear of high inflation and macroeconomic volatility. In 2009, the government implemented 
a large fiscal stimulus to revive the economy in the context of the recession. Though in 2010 the 
economy seemed to recover, from 2011 to 2015, difficulties arose again, required the government 
to take action to further reduce taxes for individuals and businesses in the short run. 
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6. Analysis of the study 
 
The purpose of this section is to find out the historical responses of discretionary fiscal policy to 
business cycle through an ex-post empirical analysis of macroeconomic and fiscal factors in 
Vietnam from 1990 to 2015. The dynamics of output and inflation will be discussed in depth, while 
various indicators are compiled and presented here to give the readers a comprehensive overview 
of the economic situation in Vietnam during this timeframe. After the analysis of macroeconomic 
conditions, the rest of this chapter is devoted to find out the stabilization characteristic of 
discretionary fiscal policy over cycles and price level through graphical and regression analysis.  
 
6.1  Economic growth & business cycles 
 
During 1990-2015, Vietnam witnessed high but unsteady economic growth. Annual growth rate 
of GDP over the past 15 years averaged 6.8 percent. Specifically, from 1990 to 1997, Vietnam 
experienced very high and impressive economic growth. Economic growth reached 9.5 percent in 
1995, while average growth for 1990-1997 stood at 8.0 percent. After the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, Vietnamese economic growth decelerated substantially, dropped to 5.8 percent in 1998 and 
4.8 percent in 1999. On average, growth from 1998 to 2002 only stood at 6.0 percent.  
 
From this point onwards, although the economy showed several signs of recovery since 2003 and 
surged to 7.5 percent in 2005 and remained above 7.0 percent until 2007, the adverse effects of the 
Global Economic Downturn lowered Vietnamese growth rate to 5.7 percent in 2008, then 5.4 
percent in 2009. Since then, growth fluctuated at 5.8 percent during the period 2008-2015. Table 
6.1 summarizes the economic performance of Vietnam over the period 1990-2015. Figure 6.2 
further shows the growth performance with a 4-year moving average. 
 
Table 6.1 GDP growth rate (%), 1992-1997, 4 phases of 2 cycles 
Year 1990-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007 2008-2015 
GDP growth  8.0 6.0 7.2 5.8 
Source: World Bank; own calculations.  
Note: 2 economic cycles can be “guesstimated” as shown above.   
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Figure 6.2 GDP growth rate (%, annual), 1990 – 2014. 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
  
The 4-year moving average of GDP growth rate supports the “hypothetical” cycles proposed in 
Table 6.1. The Simple Moving Average is also one way to smooth out the trend (the action) by 
filtering out the noise from random fluctuations, by averaging our values over 4-year period with 
equal weight for each value. Two recessions can be identified as 1998-2002 and 2008-2015. Two 
booms occurr in 1990-1997 and 2003-2007. However, GDP growth as an indicator for output 
fluctuations cannot quantify the deviation of real output from its trend.16 Figure 6.3, thus, presents 
the estimates for output gap.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Two techniques have been used to compute output gap, i.e., time linear detrending and HP-filter. In the case of 
HP-filter, I adjusted the smoothing parameter to be 100 and 6.25. The results obtained from smoothing parameter 
400 are not presented here due to its lack of precision (after compared to the estimates of output gap for Vietnam in 
Nguyen et al., (2013) and Maliszewski (2010)).   
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Figure 6.3 Output Gap Estimates by linear detrend method and Hodrick-Prescott filter  
 
Note: Values are expressed in logarithm.   
 
Figure 6.3 illustrates estimates of the output gap obtained with three approaches, and the linearly 
detrended series seems to provide the most distinctive estimation. Moreover, it seems to ignore 
small fluctuations in the output gap, i.e., 1999-2004. The correlation between linearly detrended 
series and HP-filtered series (λ=100) is indeed 0.65, and 0.49 in the case of HP-filter (λ=6.25). 
Using HP-filter (λ=6.25), the cycles become less pronounced as anticipated. The estimates from 
two HP-filter smoothing parameters are strongly correlated, with r=0.95. When correlating these 
estimates of output gap with economic growth, HP-filter (λ=100) series generates the strongest 
correlation (r=-0.42), compared to HP-filter (λ=6.25) (r=-0.38) and linear detrending method (r=-
0.1).  
 
In practice, a macroanalyst should be cautious about setting a suitable smoothing parameter, as 
inappropriate smoothing parameters could ignore real cycles (λ too low) or produce artificial 
cycles (λ too high). An inaccurate judgment of the output gap may result in a wrong application of 
fiscal policy, for instance, being expansive when there is no concrete evidence of a negative output 
gap, or being contractive when booms are only artificial and short-lived. Good estimates for output 
gap, hence, would contain an analysis of qualitative sources and establish some stylized facts about 
the long-term growth dynamics and potential structural changes in the time series.    
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6.2 Inflation and the deficits 
 
In general, inflation in Vietnam was unsustainably high during 1990-2015. For instance, inflation 
reached 23.1 percent in 2008 from the previous year of 8.3 percent. In 2012, inflation rose to 18.7 
percent from prior year of 9.2 percent. After 2011, inflation gradually declined, stood at 0.6 percent 
in 2015. We also note that the economy was experienced deflation during 1999 and 2000 (-1.7 
percent and -0.4 percent, respectively).  
 
Figure 6.4  M2 growth (y-o-y percentage change) and inflation (y-o-y percentage change).  
 
Source: ADB 
Note: nominal M2 values are deflated to obtain real M2 price before calculating M2 growth rate. 
 
The most common way to finance a budget deficit and create inflation is through expanding the 
money supply. Figure 6.4 shows that government increased the money supply M2 rapidly during 
recessions (1998-2000), while inflation seemed to appear out of nowhere after few years. M2 
growth reached 56 percent in 2000, but price level remained very low at -2 percent, though slowly 
rising to 8 percent by 2004. M2 growth reached 46 percent in 2007, but inflation was still stable, 
stayed at 8.3 percent. Inflation peaked in 2008 at 23 percent, one year after a sudden growth in M2 
to 46 percent level, from the previous year at 33.5 percent.  
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An identical series of event happened in 2010 and 2011. M2 growth surged by 33 percent in 2010, 
and in 2011 inflation rose by over 18 percent. The budget deficit was also high in 2009 (-4.2 
percent) and 2010 (-2.1 percent). Recent developments, however, show that, though budget deficit 
was increasingly expansive from 2012 to 2015 (totaled -17.4 percent), inflation was declining 
gradually from 9.1 percent in 2012 to 0.63 percent in 2015, lowest since 2001. With M2 on average 
grew by only 17 percent during 2012-2015, the lowest level for the past 15 years, this indicates 
that government found alternative ways to finance its budget deficits. 
 
An alternative way to finance a budget deficit is by issuing new bonds. Pham The Anh (2013) 
argues that in Vietnam, government’s spending financed by issuing bonds could indirectly cause 
inflation. In practice, government bonds issued by the State Treasury are not directly sold to the 
State Bank of Vietnam, but the commercial banks can bid for these newly issued bonds. 
Commercial banks take a portion of these bonds and use it as collateral to borrow from the State 
Bank and get cash in return through open market operation or repo discount window. In the end, 
this operation could indirectly increase the money base, resulting in high inflation, according to 
the findings in Pham The Anh (2013). 
 
To extend this argument, Figure 6.5 shows the size of government bonds market from 2000 to 
mid-2016. Government bonds market in Vietnam was almost non-existed in Vietnam before 2003 
but increased substantially onwards. By the last quarter of 2002, total market size was only 2 
percent of GDP, rapidly plunged to 16 percent by the first quarter of 2007. In 2014, the total size 
of bonds market reached 25 percent of GDP. This development in bonds market could somehow 
justify high inflation in 2008, but could not possibly explain the surge in 2011. 
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Figure 6.5 Size of government bonds market (% GDP)  
 
Source: ADB 
 
For the other explanation, as Thien and Hoi (2016) argue, fiscal policy in Vietnam causes inflation 
through the channel of unproductive public investment. Before the Great Recession 2008-09, 
Vietnam was already in a possibility of falling into a mini-crisis of itself when signals of 
overheated growth in 2007 (growth reached 7.5 percent). M2 growth also peaked in that year at 46 
percent, and FDI made a historical record at over 71 billion USD (Thien and Hoi, 2016). “Under 
that context, pouring more money into investment would not be able to translate into additional 
output. Thus the government expanding expenditure only pushed demand for goods, price going 
up was unavoidable” (ibid).  
 
The authors further maintain that budget deficit occurring in many consecutive years is a signal of 
“potentially long-run instability of the economy” and for that reason they proposed a set of rules 
to institutionalize countercyclical fiscal policy in Vietnam as presented in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3. Proposed rule of budget balance management 
GDP growth  > 7 % 6.5 % & <7 % <6.5 % 
Budget balance  Minimum surplus of 0.5 % 
GDP 
Surplus or balanced  Deficit not exceeding 3 % 
GDP 
Source: Thien and Hoi (2016) 
 
This proposed rule is not applicable in the case of Vietnam for several reasons. First of all, for a 
developing country, running large deficits is very important to sustain growth if inflation is under 
control. There’s no need to restrain the budget balance based on the rate of GDP growth. Assume 
next year growth increases to 8 percent, but price level reduces to -1 percent. In this case, should 
the government target a budget surplus of 0.5 percent as proposed in Table 6.3? Probably not, for 
this is the change in the real level of output, and money becomes even more expensive. Rising 
GDP growth accompanied by low and stable inflation, in this case, reflect new growth dynamics 
being established due to a number of global and domestic factors. The global factors may include 
new trade deals, rising demand abroad, surging oil price. The internal factor could be that 
government has modified existing laws to incentivize entrepreneurship and technology across 
major industries and sectors, underpin competition between domestic and international products. 
 
Moreover, in the case where a country gets struck by a severe economic crisis, a hard constraint 
for deficit not exceeding 3 percent of GDP could be a barrier to an economic recovery. In general, 
a good budget management rule should also take into account the change in general price level, in 
other words, inflation rate. 
 
Table 6.4 Planned deficit (% of GDP), and actual deficit (% of GDP), inflation (annual change, %) 
Fiscal Year (FY) Planned deficit Actual deficit Inflation 
2006 -5.0 1.2 7.5 
2007 -5.0 -0.9 8.3 
2008 -5.0 0.6 23.1 
2009 -4.8 -4.2 6.7 
2010 -6.2 -2.1 9.2 
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2011 -5.3 -0.5 18.6 
2012 -4.8 -3.4 9.1 
2013 -4.8 -5.0 6.6 
2014 -5.3 -4.4 4.1 
2015 -5.0 -4.6 0.6 
 
Sources: The Government Office’s portal (chinhphu.vn) and IMF’s WEO (inflation data) 
 
Table 6.4 makes it evident that the Vietnam’s government has each and every year set the target 
level for budget deficit constraint of around 5.0 percent of GDP since FY2006 (data before this 
point are not available). The change in planned deficit measures the government’s intention to use 
fiscal policy in the following year. Assume that policymakers cannot predict the actual level of 
budget deficit next year and the plan is not subjected to fiscal sustainability issue, any increase or 
decrease in the planned deficit would reflect the additional amount of fiscal effort the government 
willing to add into the economy through discretionary measures. Based on this assumption, 
following observations can be made about the deficits in the case of Vietnam. 
 
First, there’s a large discrepancy between the planned and the actual deficit. For instance, planned 
deficit during FY2006-FY2008 was consistently at -5 percent level, implying the intention for a 
neutral fiscal policy stance (neither expasionary nor contractionary). However, the actual budget 
deficit was not constant as planned. Moreover, when the economy slowed down in 2008-2009, the 
planned deficit for FY2010 reached -6.2 percent, implied the intention from the authorities to 
stimulate aggregate demand with the state budget. Although the intention was expansionary, the 
actual deficit in FY2010 was contractionary compared to FY2009, declined by -2.1 percent. This 
observation is disturbing: why did the central government reduce fiscal effort against the plan 
when the economy slowed down as such in 2009? 
 
This unresolved question may take us to the second finding. The plan for budget deficit seemed to 
be adjusted to control inflation. In particular, even though in 2008 growth dropped to 5.7 percent, 
the projected deficit was contractionary compared to last year (by a net change of 0.2 percent), 
This is very likely because inflation peaked to 23 percent in 2008. This pattern repeated in 2011 
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when inflation rose to 19 percent, the government promptly cut back the planned deficit for 
FY2012 to -4.8 percent, a fall of 0.5 percentage point compared to previous year’s plan. The 
change in proposed budget could therefore possibly reflect the intention of the government to curb 
high inflation, and since discretionary fiscal policy measures this intention ex-post, fiscal impulse 
as the change in discretionary fiscal balance is very likely to respond to the immediate change in 
inflation. 
 
To test this hypothesis, inflation as an indicator of price level is included in the regression model 
to see if the government has deliberately used fiscal policy to control inflation, apart from its 
traditional role as output fluctuations stabilizers. The next section set out to empirically examine 
the relationship between discretionary fiscal policy, business cycle and price volatility in Vietnam. 
 
 
6.3  Cyclicality of discretionary fiscal policy in Vietnam 
 
Changes in CAB can quantify the expected impact of discretionary fiscal policy on the economy. 
The actual impact, of course, depends on the fiscal multiplier and various factors. Fiscal impulse 
by construction captures these changes in CAB to a benchmark, and in our case, the point of 
reference is the previous year. A positive (or negative) value of fiscal impulse implies an 
expansionary (contractionary) discretionary fiscal policy. Through the analysis, fiscal impulse is 
expressed as the percentage of potential GDP, a “natural” scaling variable, as suggested by 
Fedelino et al. (2009). 
 
6.3.1  Graphical analysis 
 
From a graphical depiction of fiscal impulse over output gap, we can roughly estimate the 
cyclicality of discretionary fiscal policy in Vietnam in the study periods. A discretionary fiscal 
policy is countercyclical if fiscal impulse shows an upward trend accompanied with a recession 
(negative output gap). In other words, countercyclicality occurs when fiscal impulse moves in the 
opposite direction with output gap. On the other hand, procyclicality happens when fiscal impulse 
moves in the same direction with the measures of the output gap. In this light, Figure 6.5 shows 
the cyclicality of discretionary fiscal policy in Vietnam by putting these elements into one chart. 
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Figure 6.5 Output gap and Fiscal impulse (as percentage of potential GDP).  
 
Note: Output gap is calculated with HP_100.  
 
The chart above illustrates the year-over-year change in discretionary fiscal policy stance over the 
fluctuations in output level. The movement of fiscal impulse over business cycles shows a pattern 
of procyclicality over time. For instance, for the period from 1990 to 1994, fiscal impulse was -
1.46 percent on average, implying fiscal impulse during this period was contractionary, whereas 
the output gap remained negative. From 1995 to 1998, real GDP rose above potential GDP, 
creating a positive output gap. Moreover, the pattern of procyclicality was very clear in 4 years 
from 1995 to 1998, as fiscal impulse seems to move in the same direction with output gap. In 
particular, fiscal impulse was expansionary in 1997, reached 3.4 percent at the peak of the output 
cycle. In 1998, when the output gap was closing, fiscal impulse also dropped to -2.2 percent. In 
general, before 1998, fiscal impulse was procyclical, except for 1994.   
 
During 1999 – 2004, the economy operated under potential level, indicated by a negative output 
gap. Fiscal impulse was contractionary overall, averaged at -0.5 percent during this period. After 
this point, Vietnam began to speed up since 2005, and by 2007 the economy began to produce 
beyond its potential level. Even though a positive output gap widened, a fiscal contribution of 2.2 
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percent added to aggregate demand. When the economy fell into crisis due to the global economic 
downturn 2007-8,  fiscal policy stance contracted by 1.3 percent in 2008, compared to 2007.  
 
There have also been periods when Vietnamese discretionary fiscal policy was countercyclical, 
moving in the opposite position with output gap. For instance, a discretionary measure was taken 
in 1999, adding 1.5 percent to the domestic demand. In retrospect, by 1998 growth at this point 
already tumbled to 4.8 percent, almost half of the rate from the peak in 1997. In 1999, growth 
recovered somehow, increased to 5.8 percent, but the economy was still stuck under its potential 
level, indicated by a negative output gap. The discretionary fiscal policy measure taken in 1999 
can, therefore, be characterized as countercyclical. 
 
Discretionary fiscal policy’s countercyclicality seemed to be most profound since 2008. In 
particular, in 2009 when facing a sudden shock in domestic demand, fiscal impulse reached 4.6 
percent, largest change since 1990. This fiscal stimulus was necessary in the situation where the 
level of output all around the world retreated substantially. From 2012 to 2014, a clearer pattern 
of countercyclicality exhibits. When the economy was at the trough of the output cycle, fiscal 
impulse was ever more expansionary, adding in total 4.0 percent of effective demand from 2012 
to 2014. 
  
Overall graphical analysis has shown that Vietnam’s active fiscal policy underwent a procyclical 
conduct in the past but turned to be more countercyclical during the aftermath of the Great 
Recession 2008-09. Figure 6.6 further shows the conduct of discretionary fiscal policy over price 
level. This chart reveals that fiscal impulse tended to move in the opposite direction with inflation, 
especially with inflation, although this finding is not conclusive due to the lack of evidence. For 
that reason, we also test the hypothesis if fiscal policy responded to the change in inflation in our 
regression models. 
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Figure 6.6 Fiscal impulse and Inflation  
 
Note: DInflation: inflation, first difference between 2 periods.  
 
6.3.2 Regression analysis 
 
Table 6.7 Cyclicality of discretionary fiscal policy (HP_100). Explained variable: Fiscal impulse 
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Explanatory Variables   Model   
 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
gap (HP_100) 0.34* 0.29* 0.33* 
  
 
(1.79) (1.91) (2.31) 
  
lagged_variable -0.32 -0.04 -0.05 -0.10 0.01 
 
(-1.61) (-0.25) (-0.32) (-0.62) (0.06) 
inflation 
 
-0.68*** -0.55*** -0.64*** -0.71*** 
  
(-3.71) (-3.11) (-3.58) (-3.69) 
D2008*gap 
  
-1.02** 
  
   
(-2.13) 
  
RECESSION*gap 
   
0.74** 
 
    
(2.46) 
 
BOOM*gap 
    
0.26 
     
(1.07) 
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.43 0.52 0.49 0.37 
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Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. *** p < 1%; ** p < 5%; * p < 10%. Output gap is estimated with Hodrick-Prescott Filter, 
smoothing parameter 100. 
 
Table 6.7 presents the results from regression analysis of the cyclicality of discretionary fiscal 
policy in Vietnam during 1990-2015. The two main hypotheses are tested: (1) discretionary fiscal 
policy responded to the change in output procyclically, and (2) price level has an effect on the 
conduct of discretionary fiscal policy.  
 
Model (I) shows that fiscal impulse is positively correlated with output gap, though the relationship 
is not strong and tends to vanish when other measures of output gap being used as shown in table 
6.8 and table 6.9. The positive value of output gap’s coefficient suggests procyclicality of fiscal 
impulse over whole the period 1990-2015. 
 
While fluctuations in output have a procyclical impact on fiscal impulse, model (II) suggests 
inflation is even a better indicator of the changes in fiscal stance. In particular, results from this 
model show that fiscal impulse is negatively correlated with inflation (statistically significant at 1 
percent). This evidence implies, when inflation surges, fiscal impulse in the following year tends 
to be contractionary, whereas in the case when inflation declines, fiscal impulse tends to be more 
expansionary. Changes in output gap and inflation together can explain 43 percent of the variance 
in fiscal impulse measured as the change in cyclically adjusted balance from one year to another. 
In all specifications containing the proxy for inflation, the relationship between fiscal impulse and 
inflation is statistically significant at 1 percent level, which indicates a strong impact of inflation 
on fiscal impulse over time. 
 
Another hypothesis, which is tested in Table 6.7, is that the government reversed its course of 
discretionary fiscal policy after 2008. This hypothesis was motivated by three findings: (1) many 
developing countries have graduated from procyclicality (Frank et al. 2013); (2) Vietnam is among 
those countries who have pursued more countercyclical fiscal policy recently (Pham The Anh, 
2013; Thien and Hoi, 2016); and (3) evidence from historical and graphical analysis suggested that 
this reversal trend occurred since 2008. To test this hypothesis, I added an interaction variable 
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D2008 to the model, which take a dummy of 1 for every year since 2008. Model (III) in Table 4 
shows that after 2008 Vietnam’s government has pursued more countercyclical fiscal policy. This 
regression, which includes inflation, trend, output gap, and lagged fiscal impulse, has the highest 
explanatory power among all five specifications, explaining 52 percent of the variation in fiscal 
impulse. 
 
The next two regressions try to find whether fiscal policy responded differently to different phases 
of the cycle. To test these hypotheses, I created an interaction variable, RECESSION, which takes 
a value 1 for a negative value of output gap and 0 elsewhere. Then I multiply the variable gap with 
this dummy variable to create a new indicator for recessions as shown in Table 6.7. The procedure 
is the same to create an index for periods of booms. Results from model (IV) show that when the 
output gap is negative, discretionary fiscal policy tends to be more procyclical (statistically 
significant at 5 percent level). The effect is stronger with HP_6.25 (Table 6.9; p-value < 0.01), 
while remaining the same with linear detrended estimates of the output gap (Table 6.8; p-value < 
0.05). In booms, fiscal impulse remains procyclical, but statistically insignificant across all 
specifications. 
 
Table 6.8. Cyclicality of discretionary fiscal policy (method = linearly detrend) 
Explanatory Variables   Model   
 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
gap (linearly.dentrended) 0.26 0.29* 0.33** 
  
 
(1.27) (1.91) (2.21) 
  
lagged_variable -0.30 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 
 
(-1.45) (-0.11) (-0.13) (-0.11) (0.00) 
inflation 
 
-0.73*** -0.63*** -0.75*** -0.71*** 
  
(-4.04) (-3.50) (-4.22) (-3.73) 
D2008*gap 
  
-1.02** 
  
   
(-2.13) 
  
RECESSION*gap 
   
0.58** 
 
    
(2.19) 
 
BOOM*gap 
    
0.38 
     
(1.24) 
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Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. *** p < 1%; ** p < 5 %; * p < 10 %. Output gap is estimated as residuals of the linear 
time trend of real GDP. 
 
Table 6.9. Cyclicality of discretionary fiscal policy (HP_6.25) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** p < 1%; ** p < 5 %; * p < 10 %. Output gap is estimated by Hodrick-Prescott Filter, with smoothing parameter 6.25 
 
 
An ex-post anaylysis of Vietnam’s discretionary fiscal policy over business cycles has shown that 
Vietnam experienced high economic growth over the past 15 years. From 1990 to 2015, the 
Vietnamese has underwent two output cycles: the first cycle began since 1990 to circa 2002 (trough 
to trough), and the second cycle from 2003 to 2015 (trough to trough). Even though inflation 
thoughout this period was much lower than that before 1990, it remained highly unpredictable. 
Researches in this area show that inflation was likely caused by two channels: growth in money 
supply (M2) and government bonds. There’s also a weak evidence implying that the Vietnamese 
government has intended to use the (planned) budget deficit as a tool to curb inflation. This finding 
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.44 0.51 0.46 0.38 
Explanatory Variables   Model   
 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
gap (HP_6.25) 0.24 0.34* 0.30* 
  
 
(1.21) (2.27) (1.89) 
  
lagged_variable -0.31 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 
 
(-1.51) (-0.25) (-0.05) (-0.25) (-0.00) 
inflation 
 
-0.77*** -0.79*** -0.91*** -0.71*** 
  
(-4.32) (-4.33) (-5.79) (-3.66) 
D2008*gap 
  
0.42 
  
   
(0.76) 
  
RECESSION*gap 
   
1.04*** 
 
    
(4.04) 
 
BOOM*gap 
    
0.19 
     
(0.81) 
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.47 0.46 0.63 0.36 
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motivated the author to include inflation in the regression analysis of discretionary fiscal policy’s 
cyclicality over business cycles.  
 
In light of this idea, our evidence shows that fiscal impulse as a proxy for discretionary fiscal 
policy follows a procyclical trend, although the relationship is not strong, and this trend reversed 
since 2008. The results also suggest that discretionary fiscal policy is more procyclical during 
downturns than in upturns. Finding from regression analysis further demonstrates that 
discretionary fiscal policy tends to stabilize inflation: contractionary when price level surges and 
expansionary when price level declines. 
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6. Summary of findings 
 
Theoretical and empirical considerations suggest that discretionary fiscal policy by the government 
has a substantial impact on economic activity in the short run. Legislators can deliberately use the 
government budget, i.e. revenue and expenditure, to adjust other macroeconomic variables in the 
economy, or can also rely on the work of automatic stabilizers, if stabilization is the primary 
concern.  
 
Based on cross-country data, literature finds that fiscal policy is often procyclical in developing 
countries. Vietnam as a low-middle income country has witnessed high economic growth thanks 
to Doi Moi policies, but strong growth also came along with unexpected inflation. Research on 
Vietnam found procyclical fiscal conduct over business cycles, but the findings are inconclusive, 
and no attempts are made to see why fiscal policy respond in such a way. To close this gap in the 
literature this research asked the question of procyclicality again and went one step further to 
include inflation in the model and netted out the effect of automatic stabilizers from fiscal policy 
using the IMF approach to compute the cyclically adjusted balance. To estimate the output gap 
linear detrending and Hodrick-Prescott filter with two suggested values for smoothing parameters 
(100 and 6.25) have been used throughout the analysis. Once estimates of fiscal impulse and output 
gap were obtained, our regression analysis was performed with fiscal impulse as a dependent 
variable; inflation and output gap as regressors, while further controlled for structural change in 
time and different phases of business cycles. 
 
Findings show that the cyclical characteristic of discretionary fiscal policy in Vietnam is similar 
to that of many developing countries, which is procyclicality. Evidence shows that fiscal impulse 
as a proxy for discretionary fiscal policy follows a procyclical trend, although the relationship is 
not strong, and this trend tends to reverse after 2008. The results also suggest that discretionary 
fiscal policy is more procyclical during recessions than in booms. The evidence further 
demonstrates that discretionary fiscal policy tends to stabilize inflation: contractionary when price 
level surges and expansionary when price level declines. 
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Conclusion 
 
For a developing country, the conduct of active fiscal policy faces many challenges. The first set 
of uncertainties consists of exogenous factors: regional and international macroeconomic 
environment. The second round of problems are endogenous: history, political system, social 
tension, and various factors related to the domestic economy, especially price volatility. However, 
the toughest task for an efficient conduct of fiscal policy lies within the ability of the government 
itself to change its policy course over a short period in response to the changing economic 
conditions. 
 
In cases where the general price level behaves atypically, it is even more important for the 
government to remain flexible, actively changing fiscal policy stance over time to respond to 
significant fluctuations in output and prices. Flexibility is, hence, an art that every government 
should master for the successful practice of macroeconomic management. 
 
“Government is an art that sometimes call for deregulation and laissez-faire, sometimes 
for intervention…The trick for government, or, less pejoratively, the art of government, 
is to decide when and how much to intervene, and when and how rapidly to turn away”.  
 
Charles P. Kindleberger, (1985:21) 
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